1937 War between Japan and China
The most meaningful passages of The Effects OF Strategic Bombing ON JAPAN'S War Economy, THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY, which was written after WWII by US authorities, are as follows:
Thus, as was confirmed by many Japanese officials interrogated by the Survey, the 1937 thrust into northern China was not expected to develop into a major war. Those responsible for national policy at the time were fully confident that the Chinese government would yield quickly to Japan's demands and adjust itself readily to the position of a Japanese puppet. A full military conquest of China was considered to be neither necessary nor desirable. Troops were sent to China not to force a military decision but to serve as symbols of Japanese power. Negotiations—or rather intimidation—were to accomplish the rest.It should be noted first that "The United States Strategic Bombing Survey was a board of experts assembled to produce an impartial assessment of the effects of Anglo-American strategic bombing of Nazi Germany during the European war. After publishing its report, the Survey turned its attention to the efforts against Imperial Japan, including a separate section on the recent atomic bombing." (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Strategic_Bombing_Survey)
While the motivations for the drive into China were similar to the ones which led Japan into Manchuria, the immediate interest of the army was even more pronounced. A large contingent of the army was anxious to secure foreign "grazing grounds" which would provide a lavish "master race' ' existence. Once more large numbers of petty merchants, importers, and exporters swarmed into the newly acquired territories, to form the political and economic machine of the high command. The control of northern China became, thus, the basis of continuous well-being of a large strata of politically influential and vociferous Japanese.
Let's review incidents in the decisive year of 1937.
June 4 - Fumimaro Konoe becomes Prime Minister of Japan.
July 7 - Japanese troops exchanges fire with Chinese military units by accident around the Marco Polo Bridge or Lugou Bridge located 15 km southwest of the Beijing city center.
July 28 - Imperial Army of Japan starts an all-out attack around Beijing and north part of China.
July 29 - Japanese civilians and troops are massacred by Chinese East Hopei Army in Tongzhou, near Beijing.
August 13 - The Kuomintang Government or the Nationalist Party-led Chinese Government starts the total offensive on Shanghai, an international city governed by the UK, France, the US, and Japan. Accordingly Japanese marines stationed in Shanghai have to face 10-times larger Chinese troops in defensive battles.
August 14 - Chinese war planes start to bomb Japanese naval ships patrolling in the river running through Shanghai. They also bomb Shanghai streets, killing many Chinese and some Europeans and Americans. The number of Chinese soldiers mobilized has reached 70,000. The Imperial forces of Japan have only 6,300 marines of the Imperial Navy in Shanghai.
August 23 - Imperial military headquarters in Tokyo dispatched two divisions to Shanghai. Following this reinforcement, more troops and divisions are sent to Shanghai and inlands adjacent to the city in following months.
November 12 - The Imperial Army and Navy completely dispel Chinese troops out of Shanghai.
November 20 - The Chinese Government office led by Chiang Kaishek runs away from Nanjing to Chongqing.
December 13 - The Imperial Army of Japan defeats Chinese troops around and in Nanjing. The series of battles from Shanghai to Nanjing is finally over.
Put simply the Chinese Government and its president Chiang Kaishek sent 300,000 troops to the battle on Shanghai in July 1937. But they were defeated by the Imperial Army/Navy, so that Chinese troops ran away back to the then Chinese capital Nanjing. Japanese troops without taking a breather chased them to Nanjing 300 km west of Shanghai. In the battle of Nanjing 120,000 Japanese troops crushed 90,000 Chinese soldiers. This sever battle resulted in execution of many Chinese war prisoners by Japanese troops after occupation of Nanjing. It is estimated that the number of those unlucky Chinese soldiers cruelly executed by Japanese troops is about 20,000.
This incident gave a great shock to Chinese leaders, since they had thought that their 300,000 troops could drive away or crush Japanese troops around Shanghai. But China lost not only tens of thousands of soldiers around Shanghai but also the then capital Nanjing. Accordingly to save their face and restore any honor, China started to blame Japan for the so-called Nanjing Atrocity after WWII.
Apart from the so-called Nanjing Atrocity, by looking back to the era around 1937, it is apparent that Chinese leaders tried to pull Japan into messy war. It was partly because Chinese thought they could surely win the war against the Empire of Japan if they had fought Japanese troops inside China in 1937 (since Chinese military was helped strengthen its war preparation by Nazi Germany in preceding years), and partly because the Chinese Communist Party led by Mao Tse-tung thought that they could survive as long as their enemy, the Kuomintang Government led by Chiang Kaishek, continued to fight Japanese troops on the Chinese soil.
Chinese arrogance and conspiracies gave a chance to leaders of the Imperial Army of Japan who were beefing up defensive lines between northern China and Manchuria. In order to make Manchukuo safer, those generals would gladly march troops to Beijing and surrounding areas. And in order to keep Shanghai on the Japanese side, those generals would gladly march troops to Nanjing and surrounding areas.
The shallow judgment of Chinese leaders paved the way for the Imperial military of Japan to take the offensive around Beijing and Shanghai.
Nonetheless, then Prime Minister of Japan Konoe and other Japanese politicians were clearly against expansion of battle lines deep inside China. But the Konoe Cabinet could not stop Imperial troops from further intensifying armed conflicts on the Chinese continent. It is because the Imperial Army and Navy were directly subject to the Emperor.
The Constitution of the Empire of Japan defined the emperor as the holy supreme commander of the Imperial forces. For this reason, though the ministers of army and navy were included in the Konoe Cabinet, Prime Minister Konoe could not interfere with military movements and operations of the Army and the Navy. PM Konoe could not fire generals who were marching their troops deep into Chinese territories on their own initiatives in the name of "punishment of arrogant Chinese leaders and protection of Japanese citizens in China."
Therefore the Empire of Japan had no ambition for conquering and occupying whole China. Even Japanese generals had no intention to kill Chinese as many as possible, which is often claimed by anti-Japanese Chinese today. They happened to be drawn into the war or just took an opportunity given by Chinese leaders for their own merit.
In summary the Imperial Government led by Konoe in 1937 had no intention and plan to conquer China or even start a war against China, but samurai-spirited Japanese generals, from their bigotry and fight instinct, launched the war now called the Second Sino-Japanese War (July 7, 1937 – September 9, 1945).
This is truth of the 1937 war between Japan and China, to your surprise.
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